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Abstract
Users regularly enter sensitive data, such as passwords,
credit card numbers, or tax information, into the browser
window. While modern browsers provide powerful client-
side privacy measures to protect this data, none of these
defenses prevent a browser compromised by malware
from stealing it. In this work, we present Fidelius, a new
architecture that uses trusted hardware enclaves integrated
into the browser to enable protection of user secrets dur-
ing web browsing sessions, even if the entire underlying
browser and OS are fully controlled by a malicious at-
tacker.
Fidelius solves many challenges involved in providing
protection for browsers in a fully malicious environment,
offering support for integrity and privacy for form data,
JavaScript execution, XMLHttpRequests, and protected
web storage, while minimizing the TCB. Moreover, in-
teractions between the enclave and the browser, the key-
board, and the display all require new protocols, each with
their own security considerations. Finally, Fidelius takes
into account UI considerations to ensure a consistent and
simple interface for both developers and users.
As part of this project, we develop the first open source
system that provides a trusted path from input and output
peripherals to a hardware enclave with no reliance on ad-
ditional hypervisor security assumptions. These compo-
nents may be of independent interest and useful to future
projects.
We implement and evaluate Fidelius to measure its per-
formance overhead, finding that Fidelius imposes accept-
able overhead on page load and user interaction for se-
cured pages and has no impact on pages and page compo-
nents that do not use its enhanced security features.
1 Introduction
The web has long been plagued by malware that infects
end-user machines with the explicit goal of stealing sensi-
tive data that users enter into their browser window. Some
recent examples include TrickBot and Vega Stealer, which
are man-in-the-browser malware designed to steal bank-
ing credentials and credit card numbers. Generally speak-
ing, once malware infects the user’s machine, it can effec-
tively steal all user data entered into the browser. Modern
browsers have responded with a variety of defenses aimed
at ensuring browser integrity. However, once the machine
is compromised, there is little that the browser can do to
protect user data from a key logger.
In this paper we present a practical architecture, called
Fidelius, that helps web sites ensure that user data entered
into the browser cannot be stolen by end-user malware,
no matter how deeply the malware is embedded into the
system. When using Fidelius, users can safely enter data
into the browser without fear of it being stolen by mal-
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ware, provided that the hardware enclave we use satisfies
the security requirements.
Hardware enclaves, such as Intel’s SGX, have recently
been used to provide security for a variety of applications,
even in case of compromise [1–15]. An enclave provides
an execution environment that is isolated from the rest of
the system (more on this below). Moreover, the enclave
can attest its code to a remote web site.
One could imagine running an entire browser in an en-
clave to isolate it from OS-level malware, but this would
be a poor design – any browser vulnerability would lead
to malware inside the enclave, which would completely
compromise the design.
1.1 Our Contributions
Fidelius contains three components, discussed in detail in
the following sections: (1) a small trusted functionality
running inside an isolated hardware enclave, (2) a trusted
path to I/O devices like the keyboard and the display,
and (3) a small browser component that interacts with the
hardware enclave.
A trusted path from the hardware enclave to I/O de-
vices is essential for a system like Fidelius. First, this is
needed to prevent an OS-level malware from intercept-
ing the data on its way to and from the I/O device. More
importantly, the system must prevent out-of-enclave mal-
ware from displaying UI elements that fool the user into
entering sensitive data where the malware can read it. Be-
yond protecting web input fields, the system must protect
the entire web form to ensure that the malware does not,
for example, swap the “username” and “password” labels
and cause the user to enter her password into the username
field.
We implement a prototype trusted path to the keyboard
using a Raspberry Pi Zero that sits between the user’s ma-
chine and the keyboard and implements a secure channel
between the keyboard and the hardware enclave. We im-
plement a trusted path to the display using a Raspberry
Pi 3 that sits between the graphics card and the display.
The Raspberry Pi 3 overlays a trusted image from the
hardware enclave on top of the standard HDMI video sent
to the display from the graphics card. We discuss details
in Section 9.1. Our trusted path system is open source and
available for other projects to use. We note that we can not
use SGXIO [16], an SGX trusted I/O project, because that
system uses hypervisors, which may be compromised in
our threat model.
Another complication is the need to run client-side
JavaScript on sensitive form fields. For example, a web
site may use client-side JavaScript to ensure that a credit
card checksum is valid, and alert the user if not. Similarly,
many sites use client-side JavaScript to display a pass-
word strength meter. Fidelius should not prevent these
scripts from performing as intended. Several projects
have already explored running a JavaScript interpreter
in a hardware enclave. Examples include TrustJS [17]
and Secureworker [18]. Our work uses the ability to run
JavaScript in an enclave as a building block to enable pri-
vacy for user inputs in web applications. The challenge
is to do so while keeping the trusted enclave – the TCB –
small.
To address all these challenges, this paper makes the
following contributions:
• The design of Fidelius, a system for protecting user
secrets entered into a browser in a fully-compromised
environment.
• A simple interface for web developers to enable Fi-
delius’s security features.
• The first open design and implementation of a trusted
path enabling a hardware enclave to interact with I/O
devices such as a display and a keyboard from a fully
compromised machine.
• A browser component that enables a hardware enclave
to interact with protected DOM elements while keep-
ing the enclave component small.
• An open-source implementation and evaluation of Fi-
delius for practical use cases.
2 Background
A hardware enclave provides developers with the abstrac-
tion of a secure portion of the processor that can verifi-
ably run a trusted code base (TCB) and protect its limited
memory from a malicious or compromised OS [19, 20].
The hardware handles the process of entering and exiting
an enclave and hiding the activity of the enclave while
non-enclave code runs. Enclave code invariably requires
access to OS resources such as networking and user or
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file I/O, so developers specify an interface between the en-
clave and the OS. In SGX, the platform we use for our im-
plementation, the functions made available by this inter-
face are called OCALLs and ECALLs. OCALLs are made
from inside the enclave to the untrusted application, usu-
ally for procedures requiring resources managed by the
OS, such as file access or output to a display. ECALLs
allow code outside the TCB to call the enclave to execute
trusted code.
An enclave proves that it runs an untampered version of
the desired code through a remote attestation mechanism.
Attestation loosely involves an enclave providing a signed
hash of its initial state (including the running code), which
a server compares with the expected value and rejects if
there is any evidence of a corrupted program. In order
to persist data to disk when an enclave closes or crashes,
SGX also provides a data sealing functionality that en-
crypts and authenticates the data for later recovery by a
new instance of the enclave.
Finally, one of the key features of enclaves is the pro-
tection of memory. An enclave gives developers a small
memory region inaccessible to the OS and only available
when execution enters the enclave. In this memory, the
trusted code can keep secrets from an untrusted OS that
otherwise controls the machine. SGX provides approx-
imately 90MB of protected memory. Unfortunately, a
number of side-channel attacks have been shown to break
the abstraction of fully-protected enclave memory. We
briefly discuss these attacks and accompanying defenses
below and in Section 12.
Security of hardware enclaves. We built Fidelius using
the hardware enclave provided by Intel’s SGX. SGX has
recently come under several side-channel attacks [21,22],
making the current implementation of SGX insufficiently
secure for Fidelius. However, Intel is updating SGX us-
ing firmware and hardware updates with the goal of pre-
venting these side-channel attacks. In time, it is likely
that SGX can be made sufficiently secure to satisfy the re-
quirements needed for Fidelius. Even if not, other enclave
architectures are available, such as Sanctum for RISC-
V [23] or possibly a separate co-processor for security
operations.
3 Threat Model
We leverage a trusted hardware enclave to protect against
a network attacker who additionally has full control of
the operating system (OS) on the computer running Fi-
delius. We assume that our attacker has the power to ex-
amine and modify unprotected memory, communication
with peripherals/network devices, and communication be-
tween the trusted and untrusted components of the system.
Moreover, it can maliciously interrupt the execution of an
enclave. Note that an OS-level attacker can always launch
an indefinite denial of service attack against an enclave,
but such an attack does not compromise privacy.
We assume that the I/O devices used with the com-
puter are not compromised and that the dongles we add
to keyboards/displays follow the behavior we describe.
We could assume that there is a trusted initial setup phase
where the devices can exchange keys and other setup pa-
rameters with the enclave. This corresponds to a setting
where a user buys a new computer, sets it up with the nec-
essary peripherals, and then connects to the internet, at
which point the machine immediately falls victim to mal-
ware. Alternatively, this honest setup assumption could
easily be avoided with an attestation/key exchange step
between the peripherals and the enclave. We discuss both
options in Section 6.1.
Overview of Security Goals. We would like to provide
the security guarantee that any user data entered via a
trusted input will never be visible to an attacker, and, ex-
cept in the case of denial of service, the data received by
the server will correspond to that sent by the user, e.g.
it will not be modified, shuffled, etc. Moreover, the en-
clave will only send data to an authenticated server, and a
server will only send data to a legitimate enclave. Finally,
we wish for all the low-level protocols of our system to
be protected against tampering, replay, and other attacks
launched by the compromised OS.
The remote server in our setting cooperates to secure
the user by providing correct web application code to be
run in the enclave. We are primarily concerned with the
security of user secrets locally on a compromised device,
but this does include ensuring that secrets are not sent out
to an attacker.
Overview of Usability Goals. Although our work is
merely a prototype of Fidelius, we intend for it to be fully
functional and to defend not only against technical attacks
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on security but also against user interface tricks aiming to
mislead a user into divulging secrets to a malicious party.
This task looms particularly important in our mixed set-
ting where trusted input/output come through the same
channels as their untrusted counterparts. In particular, we
must make sure a user knows whether the input they are
typing is protected or not, what data the remote server ex-
pects to receive, and where the private data will eventually
be sent. We leave the task of optimizing the user experi-
ence to future work, but also aim to provide a tool which
can be used “as-is.”
We also want to provide a usable interface for develop-
ers that deviates only minimally from standard web devel-
opment practices. As such, we endeavor to add only the
minimal extensions or limitations to current web design
techniques to support our security requirements.
Enumeration of Attacks. After describing the system
in detail in subsequent sections, we discuss why Fidelius
satisfies our security goals. Here we briefly list the differ-
ent classes of non-trivial attacks against which we plan to
defend. Refer to Section 8 for details on the attacks and
how we defend against them.
- Enclave omission attack: The attacker fakes use of an
enclave.
- Enclave misuse attack: The attacker abuses Enclave
ECALLs for unexpected behavior.
- Page tampering attack: The attacker modifies pro-
tected page elements or JavaScript.
- Redirection attack: The attacker fakes the origin to
which trusted data is sent.
- Storage tampering attack: The attacker reads, modi-
fies, deletes, or rolls back persistent storage.
- Mode switching attack: The attacker makes unautho-
rized entry/exits from private keyboard mode.
- Replay attack: The attacker replays private key
presses or display overlays.
- Input manipulation attack: The attacker forges or ma-
nipulates placement of protected input fields.
- Timing attack: The attacker gains side-channel infor-
mation from the timing of display updates or keyboard
events.
Security Non-Goals. Fidelius provides the tools neces-
sary to form the basis of a secure web application, focus-
ing on protecting user inputs and computation over them.
We do not provide a full framework for secure web appli-
cations or a generic tool for protecting existing web appli-
cations. In particular, we do not protect against developers
who decide to run insecure, leaky, or malicious JavaScript
code inside an enclave, but we do provide a simple devel-
oper interface to protect security-critical components of
applications.
We assume the security of the trusted hardware plat-
form and that the enclave hides the contents of its pro-
tected memory pages and CPU registers from an attacker
with control of the OS, so side channel attacks on the en-
clave [21, 22] are also out of the scope of this work. We
discuss side channel attacks and mitigations for SGX in
Section 12. Physical attackers who tamper with the inter-
nal functionality of our devices also lie outside our threat
model, but we note that our trusted devices seem to be
robust against opportunistic physical attackers that do not
tamper with hardware internals but can, for example, at-
tach a usb keylogger to a computer. The SGX hardware
itself is also designed to resist advanced hardware attack-
ers.
Finally, we do not address how the honest server pro-
tects sensitive data once the user’s inputs reach it. Our
goal is to protect data from compromise on the client side
or in transit to the server. Once safely delivered to the cor-
rect origin, other measures must be taken to protect user
data. For example, we do not defend against a server who
receives secrets from the user and then displays them in
untrusted HTML sent back to the browser.
4 Architecture Overview
The goal of Fidelius is to establish a trusted path between
a user and the remote server behind a web application. To
achieve this goal, Fidelius relies on two core components:
a trusted user I/O path and a web enclave. In practice, this
involve subsystems for a secure keyboard, a secure video
display, a browser component to interact with a hardware
enclave, and the enclave itself. Figure 1 gives an overview
of the components of Fidelius.
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Figure 1: Overview of Fidelius. The web enclave, embed-
ded in a malicious browser and OS, communicates with the user
through our trusted I/O path and securely sends data to a remote
origin. We assume that both the web browser and the OS are
compromised.
4.1 Trusted User I/O Path
The trusted user I/O path consists of a keyboard and
display with a trusted dongle placed between them and
the computer running Fidelius. Each device consists of
trusted and untrusted modes. The untrusted modes op-
erate exactly the same as in an unmodified system. The
trusted keyboard mode, when activated, sends a constant
stream of encrypted keystrokes to the enclave. The en-
clave decrypts and updates the state of the relevant trusted
input field. The trusted and untrusted display modes are
active in parallel, and the trusted mode consists of a series
of overlays sent encrypted from the enclave to the dis-
play. Overlays include rendered DOM subtrees (includ-
ing, if any, the protected user inputs) placed over the un-
trusted display output as well as a dedicated portion of the
screen inaccessible to untrusted content. We cover these
functionalities and details of the protocols used to secure
them in Section 6. Finally, both trusted devices have
LEDs that notify the user when a trusted path is estab-
lished and ready to collect user input. Our system relies,
in part, on users not typing secrets on the keyboard when
these security indicator lights are off. This ensures that
only the enclave has access to secrets entered on the key-
board. We note, however, that several works have studied
the effectiveness of security indicators in directing user
behavior [24, 25] and found that users often ignore them.
We briefly discuss potential alternatives in Section 11, but
leave the orthogonal problem of designing a better user
interface – one that is more difficult to ignore – to future
work.
4.2 Web Enclave
A web enclave is essentially a hardware enclave running
a minimalistic, trusted browser engine bound to a single
web origin. A browser using a web enclave delegates the
management and rendering of portions of a DOM tree
and the execution of client-side scripts, e.g. JavaScript
and Web Assembly, to the enclave. In addition, the web
enclave can send and receive encrypted messages to and
from trusted devices and the origin server. Finally, the
web enclave provides client-side script APIs to access the
DOM subtree, secure storage, and secure HTTP commu-
nication.
When a user loads a web page, Fidelius checks whether
the page contains HTML tags that need to be protected,
e.g., secure HTML forms. If it does, it initiates a web
enclave, runs remote attestation between that enclave and
the server, and validates the identity of the server. Once
this process completes, Fidelius loads the HTML tags it
needs to protect into the web enclave and verifies their
signatures. Then, when the user accesses a protected tag,
e.g. with a mouse click, Fidelius gives control to the en-
clave, which in turn activates the devices’ trusted mode.
The trusted mode LEDs are turned on, informing the user
that the trusted path is ready to securely collect user input.
Web enclaves provide two main ways to send pro-
tected messages to a remote server: directly through an
encrypted form submission or programmatically via an
XMLHttpRequest API. When a user clicks a form’s sub-
mit button, the web browser notifies the enclave of this
event. Then, the web enclave encodes the form data fol-
lowing HTML form norms1, encrypts that data, and signs
it. The encrypted form is passed to the web browser,
which sends it to the remote server. When a script needs
to send messages to the server, it can use the XMLHttpRe-
quest web API. The web enclave XMLHttpRequest API
interface is similar to that implemented by web browsers;
however, it encrypts sensitive fields such as the request
body and custom HTTP headers. HTTP responses are
sent by the server in encrypted form. The enclave will
automatically decrypt responses and resume execution of
the JavaScript function waiting for the response.
1See, https://www.w3.org/TR/html5/sec-forms.
html
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Figure 2: Design of Fidelius’s user interface. The green area is
the trusted display overlay.
5 Interface Design
This section describes the interfaces that Fidelius provides
for end-users and developers who wish to consume or cre-
ate protected web applications. Here we describe only
how Fidelius appears to users and developers, deferring
technical details of how it works to subsequent sections.
5.1 User Interface
The primary challenge in designing an interface for a sys-
tem with a mix of trusted and untrusted components lies
in distinguishing the trusted parts from the untrusted parts
in a way that cannot be faked by an attacker. Our solution
is to dedicate a small part of the screen to the web enclave,
rendering that portion of the screen inaccessible to the OS
while the trusted display is active, as indicated by an LED
outside the display. Outside of this region, user interac-
tion with Fidelius does not differ at all from interactions
with a typical web application. Figure 2 shows the design
of Fidelius’s user interface in use on a sample payment
page. Trusted input fields do not have any special visual
features that distinguish them from other inputs. Instead,
the dedicated trusted region of the screen displays infor-
mation that defends against attacks which make use of UI
manipulation to fool a user into giving sensitive data to an
attacker.
There are two important pieces of information shown
in the protected display region. First, we must ensure
that the user sends sensitive information only to the in-
tended destination and avoids attacks like changing the
contents of the url bar or picture-in-picture attacks [26].
We achieve this by including the origin of the web enclave
in the trusted region. In Figure 2, the trusted region shows
that the web enclave is connected to pay.site.com.
Second, we must ensure that users can distinguish real
trusted inputs from untrusted ones and that an attacker
cannot fool the user by changing the untrusted text sur-
rounding a trusted input field. This could include attacks
where untrusted input fields are made to look just like
trusted ones (which in fact is the case by default in Fi-
delius) or, for example, where the username and pass-
word prompts before two inputs are switched, causing the
user’s password to be processed as a username, which po-
tentially receives far less protection after being sent to the
server. We protect against this class of attacks by display-
ing a name for each trusted input in the dedicated display
region when that field has focus. This serves to indicate to
the user that the current input field is trusted. It also pro-
tects against any attack involving shuffling of input field
labels to fool a user or cause incorrect data to be sent to the
server because the descriptive name for each input field
lies outside the reach of an attacker.
5.2 Developer Interface
Design of a developer interface must provide an easy to
use and backwards compatible way for developers to ac-
cess the features of Fidelius. Our developer interface re-
quires no changes for pages or components of pages that
do not make use of Fidelius’s features. Developers who
wish to provide stronger security guarantees to Fidelius
users include additional attributes in existing HTML tags
directing Fidelius to use the web enclave in rendering and
interacting with the content of those tags. Listing 1 shows
an example of an HTML page supporting Fidelius.
1 <html>
2 <head> [...] </head>
3 <body>
4 <form action="submit_data"
5 name="payment"
6 method="POST"
7 secure="True" sign="tX5ReRzE42Qw">
8 <input type="text"
9 value="Holder" name="holder" />
10 <input type="text"
11 value="Card Number" name="card"/
>
12 <input type="text"
13 value="MM/YY" name="exp"/>
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14 <input type="text"
15 value="CVV" name="cvv"/>
16 </form>
17 <div class="btn"><p>Place order</p></div>
18 <div class="btn"><p>Cancel</p></div>
19 <script type="text/JavaScript"
20 src="validator.js"
21 secure="True" sign="Fi3Rt9mq2ff0"
>
22 </script>
23 </body>
24 </html>
Listing 1: Fidelius-enabled code for the online payment web
page. In red, the new HTML attributes required by Fidelius.
Fidelius currently supports <form>, <input>, and
<script> tags. To mark any of these tags as compatible
with Fidelius, developers add a secure attribute to the
tag. In the case of <script> and <form> tags, a sig-
nature over the content of the tag is included in a sign
attribute, to be verified with respect to the server’s pub-
lic key inside the enclave as described in Section 7. The
signature ensures that the form and script contents have
not been modified by malware before they were passed to
the enclave. The signature is not needed for <input>
tags because the signature on a form includes the inputs
contained within it. <input> tags also require a name
attribute to be shown in the trusted component of the dis-
play when that input has focus.
JavaScript included in secure <script> tags runs
on an interpreter inside the web enclave with different
scope than untrusted code running in the browser. Trusted
JavaScript has access to its own memory and its own web
APIs for secure storage and secure HTTP requests, but it
cannot directly access the memory or web APIs available
to untrusted JavaScript. Trusted and untrusted JavaScript
can, however, make calls to each other and pass informa-
tion between each other as needed using an interface sim-
ilar to the postMessage cross-origin message passing
API.
Fidelius enforces a strict same-origin policy for web
enclaves, so network communication originating or end-
ing in an enclave can only come from its specified origin.
By default, the origin of HTML tags is inherited from the
web page. In general, the origin is derived from the ini-
tial URL of the page. However, for tags such as <form>
and <script>, the origin is derived from the action
and src attributes respecively. The origin specified here
is not authenticated and therefore susceptible to tamper-
ing. We discuss the process by which a web enclave
connects to remote servers and verifies their legitimacy
in Section 7.
6 Trusted Path for User I/O
In this section, we describe the building blocks to create
and manage a trusted path connecting a keyboard, display,
and web enclave. Specifically, we cover device setup,
communication patterns between devices, and the struc-
ture of individual messages passed between devices.
Although we develop our trusted I/O path in the context
of the larger Fidelius system and focus our discussion on
web applications, it is important to note that the trusted
path is fundamentally a separate system from the web en-
clave. In other words, although the two systems interact
closely in the design of Fidelius, the trusted path has ap-
plications outside the web and can be run on its own as
well. To our knowledge, this is the first system to pro-
vide a trusted path to the user for both input and output
relying only on assumptions about enclave security. We
cover the details of how we realize the trusted peripherals
in hardware dongles in Section 9.
6.1 Setup
In order to securely communicate, the web enclave and
peripherals (or the dongles connected to them) must have
a shared key. One option is to operate in a threat model
with an initial trusted phase where we assume the com-
puter is not yet compromised. Pre-shared keys are ex-
changed when the user configures the computer for the
first time. Devices store the key in an internal memory,
and the enclave seals the shared keys for future retrieval.
The key can be accessed only by the enclave directly and
not by user-provided JavaScript running inside it.
In the more realistic setting where new peripherals
can be introduced to a computer over time, we must
protect against attacks that involve introduction of mali-
cious periphal devices. In this setting, we need Fidelius-
compatible devices to include a trusted component that
can perform an attestation with the enclave to prove its
legitimacy before exchanging keys. Note that this attesta-
tion must occur in both directions – from enclave to key-
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board and from keyboard to enclave – or the device that
does not attest can be faked by an attacker.
6.2 Trusted Communication
The process of switching between trusted and untrusted
modes presents an interesting security challenge. An
authentication procedure between the enclave and the
trusted devices can ensure that only the enclave initiates
switches between trusted and untrusted modes, but this
ignores the larger problem that the enclave must rely on
the untrusted OS to inform it when an event has happened
that necessitates switching modes. Avoiding that neces-
sity would require moving a prohibitively large fraction
of the browser and UI into an enclave. Our solution has
two parts and relies on making the user aware of when
key presses produce trusted or untrusted input. First, we
include a light on each dongle that turns on only when the
keyboard or display are in trusted mode. This alone, how-
ever, does not suffice to solve the problem, as an attacker
could mount a “rapid switching” attack where it jumps in
and out of trusted mode faster than the user can perceive
or react, leading to parts of the user’s input being leaked
by untrusted input. Even worse, rapid switching between
modes may occur quickly enough to not be noticable to
a user monitoring the lights. To prevent this attack, we
force a short delay when switching out of trusted mode.
This ensures the user will have time to notice and react
when a switch occurs.
The enclave switches devices in and out of trusted
mode by sending one of two reserved messages which are
simply fixed strings that they interpret as commands to
change the trust setting. When in trusted mode, messages
between the enclave and the peripherals are encrypted as
described in Section 6.3.
Since the timing of key presses can reveal sensitive
information about what keys are being pressed [27],
we must also avoid leaking timing information while in
trusted input mode. We do this by having the keyboard
send a constant stream of key presses where most contain
only an encryption of a dummy value that indicates no key
pressed. As long as the fixed frequency of key presses ex-
ceeds the pace at which a user types, the user experience
is unaffected by this protection. Since user key presses
typically result in changes on the display, we update the
display contents at the same rate as we read keyboard in-
puts.
Our trusted input design in many ways mirrors that
of Bumpy [28] and SGX-USB [29], which also provide
generic trusted user input using similar techniques but do
not provide the web functionality that we do. In contrast
to our work, Bumpy does not display any trusted user in-
put. SGX-USB allows for generic I/O but does not solve
the problem of mixing trusted and untrusted content in a
user interface as we do in both our keyboard and display.
Neither system has source code available. We improve
on the features of both works by protecting against timing
attacks on encrypted data sent from trusted input devices.
6.3 Message structure
Messages sent in the trusted communication protocol de-
scribed above must include safeguards against replay at-
tacks. To do this, we include a counter in every message
sent, so that the same count never repeats twice. Coun-
ters are maintained on a per-device and per-origin basis,
so every message between the enclave and the keyboard
or display must include a counter value and the name of
the origin in addition to the encrypted key press or overlay
itself.
7 Web Enclave
In this section we cover the details of the web enclave.
First, we provide an overview of the state transitions of a
web enclave. Next, we present the protocols for remote at-
testation, origin authentication, and exchange of key ma-
terial. Finally, we present the details of the operations: se-
cure HTML forms, JavaScript code execution, secure net-
work communication, and persistent storage across web
enclave executions.
7.1 Web Enclave State Machine
The web enclave implements the state machine in Fig-
ure 3. At any point, it can be in one of the following five
states: initial, authenticated, ready, end, and fail. Tran-
sitions are caused by ECALLs. Each state has a list of
accepted ECALLs. For example, the initial state accepts
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only ECALLs for the remote attestation and origin vali-
dation. Other ECALLs bring the web enclave to the fail
state. No other transition is possible from this state, and
the enclave needs to be terminated after reaching it.
Fidelius creates a web enclave when it finds any
<form> or <script> tags with the secure attribute
set. Then it derives the origin of the tags that need to be
protected. By default, the origin of the tags are inher-
ited from the web page they belong to, i.e., the domain
and port of the URL. However, for tags such as <form>
and <script>, the origin is derived from the action
and src attributes respecively. Tags can have different
origins. While it is possible to create one web enclave
for each origin, the current version of the web enclave
assumes that all protected components on a page commu-
nicate with the same origin.
Once the origin has been determined, Fidelius passes
the origin to the web enclave and performs remote attesta-
tion and origin validation, after which the enclave and the
origin can share a symmetric key. This key will be used to
encrypt any communication between the enclave and the
origin, so any network manipulation or monitoring will
only result in an attacker recovering encrypted data for
which it does not have the key. As a result, the rest of the
network stack can remain outside the enclave in untrusted
code. In order to verify an origin, the enclave must have
the corresponding public key, either as a hard-coded value
or, more realistically, by verifying a certificate signed by
a hard-coded authority.
At this point, the web enclave is in the authenticated
state. Fidelius retrieves the tags with the secure at-
tribute set and loads them into the enclave. These oper-
ations do not cause a state transition. The only ECALL
that causes a valid transition from this state is verification
of the signatures. If the validation of all signatures suc-
ceeds, the enclave enters the ready state. From this point
on, the enclave is fully operational and can decrypt key-
board inputs, prepare encrypted outputs for the display,
execute JavaScript functions, and take/release control of
the trusted path upon focus and blur events respectively.
7.2 Features
Once an enclave has successfully entered the ready state,
the full functionality of Fidelius becomes available to the
web application. Fidelius supports secure HTML forms,
Initial
Ready
Authed
End
Fail
Ecall Success
Ecall Failure
Remote Attestation & 
origin verification
Add forms
Add JavaScript
Verify tag signatures
Run JavaScript
Event notifications
Get encrypted keystrokes
Send encrypted frames
Exit page or manually 
terminate
Figure 3: State machine representing web enclave behavior.
JavaScript execution, secure network communication, and
persistent protected storage.
Secure HTML Forms. When parsing a page, Fidelius
finds <form> tags with the secure attribute and, after
verifying the provided signature using the server’s pub-
lic key, creates a form data structure inside the enclave
to keep track of the form and each of the inputs inside
it. We currently store server public keys inside the en-
clave but could replace this with root certificates instead.
When the user highlights an input inside a given form,
the browser notifies the enclave. The enclave switches the
keyboard from untrusted to trusted input mode (see Sec-
tion 6 for details), and subsequent user key presses modify
the state of the highlighted input field. As mentioned in
Section 5, various defenses at the interface level protect
against attacks that an attacker could mount by modifying
untrusted content between the enclave and the user. By
pushing these defensess into the UI, we allow ourselves
to keep many components of the browser outside of the
enclave and dramatically reduce Fidelius’s TCB. For ex-
ample, monitoring of mouse movements and placement
of forms on the page can be managed outside the enclave,
and tampering/dishonesty with these elements will be de-
tected by a user who notices the inconsistency between
what she sees on the screen and the content of the trusted
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overlay.
Submission of HTML forms involves encrypting the
content of the form as one blob using the shared key ne-
gotiated during attestation and sending that to the server.
Javascript. We run a JavaScript interpreter inside the en-
clave but leave out heavy components like the event loop.
When a trusted JavaScript function is called, the enclave
provides the interpreter with function inputs and any other
state that should be available to the code about to run.
Javascript running in the enclave can access the con-
tent of protected HTML forms via the the global variable
forms. The forms variable contains a property for each
form name. For example, with reference to the HTML
code in Listing 1, the payment form can be accessed via
forms.payment where payment is the value of the
attribute name of the <form> tag. Developers can im-
plement custom input validation procedures. For exam-
ple, a very simple form of validation can be checking if
the credit card field contains forbidden characters such
as white spaces. The JavaScript function that verifies the
presence of white spaces can be implemented as shown in
Listing 2.
1 function cardNumberHasWhiteSpaces() {
2 return /\s/g.test(forms.payment.card);
3 }
Listing 2: Simple form validation
Network Communication. In order for protection of user
data on the local machine to translate into a useful web
application, there must be a mechanism for transmitting
data out from the enclave without tampering by the com-
promised browser or OS. We provide a basic mechanism
for doing this by supporting HTML forms, but web ap-
plications in general need to send back data to the server
programmatically in a variety of contexts, not just when a
user submits a form. To support this need, we provide
support for XMLHttpRequests (as shown in Listing 3)
where requests are encrypted inside the enclave using the
shared key from the attestation process before leaving the
enclave.
1 function doPay(e) {
2 // input form to JS associative array
3 d = toDict(forms.payment);
4
5 // validate payment data
6 if (validate(d)) {
7 return false;
8 }
9
10 // prepare raw messages
11 json_str = JSON.stringify(d);
12
13 // create SecureXMLHttpRequest
14 var xhr = new SecureXMLHttpRequest();
15 xhr.open("POST",
16 "https://pay.site.com/submit_data",
17 false); // only sync calls
18
19 // use sec_json content type
20 xhr.setRequestHeader('Content-Type',
21 'application/sec_json; charset=UTF-8');
22
23 // encrypt, sign, and send
24 xhr.send(json_str);
25
26 // seal data for possible future reuse
27 storeCreditCardData(d);
28 }
Listing 3: XMLHTTPRequest example
The problem of defending against replay of messages
over the network is not unique to the trusted hardware set-
ting and must be handled separately by applications built
on Fidelius.
Persistent Storage. Fidelius provides developers with a
web storage abstraction similar to the standard web stor-
age provided by unmodified web browsers. Secure web
storage can be accessed via localStorage, as shown
in Listing 4.
1 function storeCreditCardData(d){
2 localStorage['holder'] = d.holder;
3 localStorage['cc'] = d.card;
4 localStorage['exp'] = d.expiry;
5 localStorage['cvv'] = d.cvv;
6 }
Listing 4: Web storage
When the need for persistent storage arises, Fidelius en-
crypts the data to be stored using a sealing key and stores
it on disk (it could equivalently use existing browser stor-
age mechanisms to hold the encrypted data). The sealing
key is a feature provided by SGX to an enclave in order to
store persistent data across multiple runs of the enclave.
This approach raises two problems we must resolve.
First, every instance of the same enclave shares the same
sealing key, so we must ensure that different enclaves cre-
ated by the same browser cannot read each others’ secrets.
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We can prevent this problem by including the associated
origin as additional authenticated data with the encrypted
data to be stored. This way an enclave can find and re-
store data associated with the origin it connects to but, as
a matter of policy, does not allow the user to access data
associated with any other origin. The integrity guarantees
of our trusted hardware platform ensure that our code will
abide by this policy.
The second issue is that of rollback attacks. A mali-
cious operating system could roll back or delete data that
is stored to disk, so, for applications that rely on main-
taining sensitive state, the enclave must have a way to de-
termine whether it has the most up-to-date stored data.
A generic solution to this problem, such as ROTE [30],
would suffice, but ROTE requires a distributed setting
which may not be available to a user browsing the web
from home. We can solve this problem by enlisting the
assistance of the server to ensure protection against roll-
backs, especially in situations where an enclave is con-
nected to a server that already keeps information about the
user. The idea is to keep a revision number, one for each
origin, that gets sent from the server to the enclave at the
end of the attestation process and is incremented when-
ever changes are made to locally stored data. Since the
attacker cannot change the number stored on the server or
in the enclave during execution, we can detect whenever a
rollback attack has been launched or stored data has been
deleted by observing a mismatch between the number on
the data reloaded by the enclave and the number sent by
the server.
Our generic approach for storage of user secrets and
network connections could easily be extended to include
storage of cookies, resulting in a separate cookie store,
accessible only to the enclave, that otherwise provides the
same functionality available from cookies in unmodified
browsers.
8 Security Analysis
In this section we give a clear enumeration of the differ-
ent kinds of threats against which we expect Fidelius to
defend and argue that Fidelius does indeed protect against
these attacks. We first discuss attacks on the core features
of Fidelius and then move on to attacks targeted specifi-
cally at the trusted I/O path and user interface.
8.1 Attacks on Core Features
Enclave omission attack. An attacker with full control
of the sofware running on a system may manipulate the
browser extension and enclave manager software to pre-
tend to use an enclave when in fact it does not. This attack
will, however, fail because of defenses built into our user
interface via the keyboard and display dongles. Absent a
connection to a real enclave, the trusted input lights on the
keyboard and display will not light, alerting the user that
entered data is unprotected.
Enclave misuse attack. A more subtle attack of this
form uses the enclave for some tasks but fakes it for oth-
ers. For example, to circumvent the defense above, trusted
input from the user could use the real enclave function-
ality, but trusted output on the display could be spoofed
without the enclave. As such, it is necessary for each
I/O device to separately defend against fake use of an en-
clave. The defenses described for the previous attack suf-
fice to protect against this attack as well, but both lights
are needed.
An attacker could also use the genuine trusted I/O path
but attempt to omit use of the enclave when running
JavaScript inside the browser. This attacker could clearly
not access persistent storage, trusted network communi-
cation, or user inputs because those features require keys
only available inside the enclave. On the other hand, the
JavaScript to be run inside the enclave is not encrypted,
so an attacker could potentially also run it outside the
enclave, so long as it does not make use of any other
resources or features offered by Fidelius. At this point,
however, the JavaScript becomes entirely benign because
it cannot give the attacker running it any new informa-
tion or convince the user or remote server of any false-
hoods because the trusted paths to all private information
or trusted parties are barred.
A last variant of this attack would omit certain ECALLs
that perform necessary setup operations like initializing a
form and its inputs before the user begins to enter data.
Omission of these ECALLs would result in the system
crashing but would not leak secrets in the process. As
mentioned before, we cannot conceivably protect against
a denial of service attack where the compromised OS re-
fuses to allow any access to the system. We can only en-
sure that normal or abnormal use of the enclave does not
leak user secrets.
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Page tampering attack. Failing to omit an enclave en-
tirely or even partially, the attacker can turn to modifying
the inputs given to various ecalls. In particular, the names
and structure of forms and their inputs or the JavaScript
to be run inside the enclave could be modified. Mounting
this attack, however, would require an adversary who can
break the unforgeability property of the signatures used
to sign secure <form> and <script> tags. Those tags
are verified with an origin-specific public key (either hard-
coded in the enclave or verified with a certificate) that lies
out of reach of our attacker.
Since trusted JavaScript is the only way to access
trusted user inputs from within the browser, the fact that
we have separate scope for execution of trusted and un-
trusted JavaScript means that any attempt to directly ac-
cess user secrets stored in protected inputs will necessar-
ily be thwarted.
Redirection attack. This attack resembles a straight-
forward phishing attempt. Instead of tampering with the
operation of Fidelius, a browser could navigate to a ma-
licious website designed to look legitimate in an attempt
to send user secrets to an untrusted server. Here again the
persistent overlay added by our display dongle prevents an
attack by displaying the origin to which the enclave has
connected. The strict same-origin policy within the en-
clave means that the origin displayed in the trusted portion
of the screen is the only possible destination for network
connections originating withing the enclave. While an at-
tacker could establish a connection with a server other
than the declared origin, the data sent to that server will
be encrypted with a key known only to the intended ori-
gin, rendering the data useless to others. As such, the only
way for an attacker to have legitimate-looking text appear
there is to send user data only to legitimate destinations.
Storage tampering attack. Although authenticated
encryption with a sealing key tied to the enclave protects
persistently stored data from tampering, an attacker can
still delete or roll back the state of stored data. We detail
our solution to protect against this attack in Section 7.2,
where we enlist the assistance of the server to keep an
up-to-date revision number for the enclave’s data out of
reach of the attacker. Attacks where the browser connects
to a malicious site whose trusted JavaScript tries to read
or modify persistent storage for other sites are prevented
by our policy of strict separation between stored data as-
sociated with different origins.
8.2 Attacks on Trusted I/O Path and UI
We now consider attacks against the trusted I/O path to
the user. Direct reading of private key presses and display
outputs is prevented by encryption of data between the
enclave and keyboard/display dongles, but we also con-
sider a number of more sophisticated attacks. Since the
I/O path to the user closely relates to the user interface, we
discuss attacks against both the protocols and the interface
together. We discuss security considerations involved in
the setup of trusted I/O devices in Section 6.1.
Mode switching attack. As discussed in Section 6, the
decision to switch between trusted and untrusted modes
ultimately lies with the untrusted browser because it de-
cides when an input field receives focus or blurs or when
to activate Fidelius in the first place. We defend against
this type of tampering with the light on the dongles
and the delay when switching from trusted to untrusted
modes. These defenses protect against both a standard
unauthorized exit from the enclave as well as a rapid
switching attack that tries to capture some key presses by
quickly switching between modes.
Replay attack. We defend against replay of trusted
communications between the enclave and display by in-
cluding a non-repeating count in every message that is
always checked to make sure an old count does not re-
peat. An attacker could, however, eavesdrop on key
presses destined for one enclave, switch to a second en-
clave connected with a site it controls, and replay the
key presses to the second enclave in an attempt to read
trusted key presses. We defend against this attack by in-
cluding the name of the origin along with the count in en-
crypted messages, so they cannot be replayed across dif-
ferent enclaves. Likewise, since the keyboard and display
use different keys to encrypt communications with the en-
clave(s), messages cannot be replayed across sources.
Input manipulation attack. Attackers can attempt to
make untrusted input fields appear where a user might ex-
pect trusted input fields and thereby fool users into typing
trusted information in untrusted fields. Since the attacker
has almost full control of what gets placed on the display,
this grants considerable freedom in manipulating the dis-
play to mimic visual queues that would indicate secure
fields. Fortunately, our display dongle reserves a strip at
the bottom of the screen for trusted content directly from
the enclave. This area informs the user what trusted input
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is currently focused, if any.
An attacker could also manipulate the placement of ac-
tual trusted input fields or the labels that precede them
on a page in order to confuse or mislead a user as to the
purpose of each field. By using the trusted display area
to show which trusted input currently has focus, if any,
we give developers the opportunity to assign inputs de-
scriptive trusted names that will alert a user if there is a
mismatch between an input’s name and its stated purpose
in the untrusted section of the display.
Timing attack. The fact that key presses originate with
the user means that the timing of presses and associated
updates to content on the screen may leak information
about user secrets [27]. We close this timing side chan-
nel by having the keyboard send encrypted messages to
the enclave at a constant rate while in trusted mode, send-
ing null messages if the user does not press a key during a
given time period and queueing key presses that appear in
the same time period. A high enough frequency for this
process ensures that the user experience is not disrupted
by a backlog of key presses. Updates to display overlay
contents also happen at a constant rate, so timing chan-
nels through key presses and display updates cannot leak
information about user secrets.
Multi-Enclave Attacks. As mentioned in Section 3,
Fidelius does not aim to protect against attacks mounted
by incorrect or privacy-compromising code provided by
an origin that has already been authenticated. That
said, we briefly discuss here some attacks that could be
launched by collaboration between a malicious OS and
a malicious remote origin that is trusted by Fidelius (for
example, in case of a maliciously issued certificate) and
which tries to steal data a user meant to send to a dif-
ferent trusted origin. An attacker who has compromised
a trusted site could always ask for data from a user di-
rectly, rendering these attacks less important in practice,
but there may be some kinds of data a user would only
want to reveal to one trusted origin and not others, e.g. a
password for a particular site.
First we consider an enclave-switching attack, a more
involved variant of the mode-switching attack described
above. In this attack, the untrusted sytem rapidly switches
between different enclaves, one connecting to a legitimate
site and the other to a malicious site controlled by the at-
tacker. Fidelius’s existing mode-switching delay also pro-
tects against this variant of the attack because the display
always shows the origin associated with the enclave cur-
rently in use.
A more complicated attack could run one honest, un-
compromised enclave concurrently with an enclave con-
nected to an malicious origin. The uncompromised en-
clave would feed its overlays to the display while the
compromised enclave would receive inputs from the key-
board. This may be noticed by users in the current Fi-
delius design because anything typed would not appear on
the display, but by the time a user notices this, secrets may
have already been compromised. To defend against this,
the keyboard and display dongles could be configured to
only connect to one enclave at a time (not connecting to
another enclave until the first enclave declares it has en-
tered the end state) and to check that they have connected
to the same enclave at setup by using the enclave to send
each other hashes of fresh origin-specific secrets.
9 Implementation
We implemented a prototype of Fidelius, including both
the trusted path described in Sections 5 and 6 and the Web
Enclave features described in Section 72. Our prototype
is fully functional but does not include the trusted setup
stage between the enclave and devices, which we carry
out manually. Figure 4 shows screenshots of our proto-
type in use, and Figure 5 gives an overview of its physical
construction.
Since Fidelius requires few changes on the server side
and our evaluation therefore focuses on browser overhead,
we do not implement a server modified to run Fidelius.
This would consist mainly of having the server verify a
remote attestation and decrypt messages from the web en-
clave.
9.1 Trusted Path
Our prototype runs on an Intel Nuc with a 2.90 GHz Core
i5-6260U Processor and 32 GB of RAM running Ubuntu
16.04.1 and SGX SDK version 2.1.2. We produced don-
gles to place between the Nuc and an off-the-shelf key-
board and display using a Raspberry Pi Zero with a 1
2Our open source implementation of Fidelius, the instructions to
build the dongles and accompanying sample code are available at
https://github.com/SabaEskandarian/Fidelius.
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Figure 4: Images of our Fidelius prototype in use. The image
above shows the view of a user, and the image below shows the
view of an attacker taking a screen capture while the user enters
credit card information. Since trusted overlays are decrypted and
placed over the image after leaving the compromised computer,
the attacker does not see the user’s data.
GHz single core Broadcom BCM2835 processor and 512
MB of RAM running Raspbian GNU/Linux 9 (stretch) for
the keyboard and a Raspberry Pi 3 with a 1.2 GHZ quad-
core ARM Cortex A53 processor and 1GB RAM running
Raspbian GNU/Linux 9 (stretch) at a display resolution
of 1280x720. Figures 6 and 7 show our input and output
dongle devices.
The Raspberry Pi Zero simulated two input devices to
the Nuc, one standard keyboard and one secure keyboard,
with only one device active at any time based on the state
of the application being run. The RPI 3 uses a B101
rev. 4 HMDI to CSI-2 bridge and the Picamera Python
library [31] to treat the HDMI output from the Nuc as a
camera input on which it overlays trusted content before
rendering to the real display. Trusted content is sent over a
separate bluetooth channel. The bluetooth channel exists
as a matter of convenience for implementation, as HDMI
does allow for sending auxiliary data, but we were unable
to programmatically access this channel through existing
drivers.
When an encrypted overlay packet reaches the RPI3
display device from the Nuc, it is first decrypted and de-
coded from a flat black and white encoding used to trans-
fer data back to a full RBG color representation. Next, the
image is transferred from the decryption/decoding pro-
gram to the rendering code, which places it on the screen.
We introduce a refresh delay between sending frames to
give the Picamera library adequate time to render each
frame before receiving the next one.
Although we have built a working Fidelius prototype, a
number of improvements could make for a more power-
ful and complete product. These changes include minia-
turization of dongle hardware, faster transfer protocols,
e.g. USB 3.0 instead of Bluetooth, and custom drivers to
reduce latency between the dongles and the keyboard/dis-
play. We leave the engineering task of optimizing Fidelius
to future work.
9.2 Browser and Web Enclave
On the Intel Nuc device, Fidelius is implemented as
a Chrome browser extension running on Chrome ver-
sion 67.0.3396 communicating with a native program via
Chrome’s Native Messaging API3 for web enclave man-
agement. The extension activates on page load and checks
whether the page contains components that need to be
protected, e.g., secure HTML forms and JavaScript. If
it does, it communicates with the native program to initi-
ate the web enclave and perform remote attestation with
the server. Once this process completes, the user can in-
teract with secure components on the page, and secure
JavaScript code can be run in the enclave. Since the page
setup process occurs independently of the page loading
in the browser, only the secure components of a page are
delayed by the attestation process – non-secure elements
of a page have no loading penalty as a result of running
Fidelius.
The majority of the work of enclave management is
handled by the native code. For symmetric encryption
of forms, bitmaps, and keystrokes we use AES-GCM en-
3See https://developer.chrome.com/apps/
nativeMessaging
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Figure 5: Prototype of the trusted path: (a) standard USB keyboard connected to our RPI Zero dongle to encrypt keystrokes, (b)
Computer with a Fidelius-enabled browser, and (c) standard HDMI display connected to our RPI 3 dongle to overlay secure frames.
Power
USB to
Computer
Debugging 
Display
Bluetooth Keyboard InputOutput pins for LED
Figure 6: Trusted keyboard dongle built from Raspberry Pi
Zero. In untrusted mode, the dongle forwards key presses from
the keyboard to the computer. In trusted mode, the dongle sends
a constant stream of encrypted values to the enclave. The val-
ues correspond to key presses if there has been any input or null
values otherwise.
cryption and for signing forms we use ECDSA signatures.
JavaScript inside the enclave is run on a version of the
tiny-js [32] interpreter that we ported to run inside the
enclave.
10 Evaluation
We evaluate Fidelius in order to determine whether the
overheads introduced by the trusted I/O path and web en-
clave are acceptable for common use cases and find that
Fidelius outperforms display latency on some recent com-
HDMI In
(Computer) HDMI Out(Display)
Power
Bluetooth
Dongle
HDMI to 
Camera 
Input
Output pins for LED
Figure 7: Trusted display dongle built from Raspberry Pi
3. Frames arrive on the RPI3 over HDMI in, which connects
through a board that treats the frames to be displayed as camera
inputs. Overlays are transmitted over Bluetooth and decrypted
on the RPI3. The combined frame and overlay go to the display
through the HDMI out cable.
mercial devices by as much as 2.8× and prior work by
13.3×. Moreover, communication between the browser
and enclave introduces a delay of less than 40ms to page
load time for a login page. We also identify which com-
ponents of the system contribute the most overhead, how
they could be improved for a production deployment,
and how performance scales for larger and more complex
trusted page components.
TCB Size. The trusted code base for Fidelius consists
of 8,450 lines of C++ code, of which about 3200 are li-
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Figure 8: Fidelius key press to display la-
tency compared with the screen response
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Figure 9: Fidelius’s impact on page load
time as the number of trusted components
varies. Adding components does not sig-
nificantly affect load time.
Figure 10: Breakdown of display costs
by component. Render/refresh delays are
an artifact of our hardware and could be
dramatically reduced.
braries for handling form rendering and another 3800 are
our enclave port of tiny-js. This does not include na-
tive code running outside the enclave or in the browser
extension because our security guarantees hold even if an
attacker could compromise those untrusted components
of the system. It also excludes dongle code which runs on
the Raspberry Pi devices and not the computer running
the web browser. Compared to the 18,800,000 lines of
the Chrome project4, Fidelius supports many of the im-
portant functionalities one may wish to secure in a web
browser while exposing an attack surface orders of mag-
nitude smaller than a naive port of a browser into a trusted
execution environment.
Comparison to Commercial Devices. For a standard lo-
gin form with username and password fields, Fidelius’s
key press to display latency is 201.8 ms. We exclude the
time it takes to transfer the encrypted key press from the
keyboard to the enclave over USB 2.0 (480 Mbps) and
the encrypted bitmap from the enclave to the display over
bluetooth (3 Mbps) from these figures. This is a reason-
able omission because the size of the data being trans-
ferred is small compared to the transfer speed of these
two protocols. Figure 8 compares the latency between
a key press and display update in Fidelius to measure-
ments of the display latency on several commercial mo-
4https://www.openhub.net/p/chrome/analyses/
latest/languages_summary
bile devices [33]. Although not competitive with high-
performance devices, Fidelius performs comparably or
even faster than some popular commercial devices, run-
ning 2.8× faster than the latency on the most recent Kin-
dle. Fidelius’s efficiency arises from leaving the majority
of a page unmodified and only using encrypted overlays
for trusted components.
Comparison to Prior Work. We also compared Fidelius
to Bumpy [28], which provides a trusted input functional-
ity but no corresponding display. For this comparison, we
compared Bumpy to Fidelius’s trusted path without the
display component, which accounts for the vast majority
of the latency. Bumpy’s source code is not available, so
we compare to the reported performance values measured
on an HP dc5750 with an AMD Athlon64 X2 Processor
at 2.2 GHz and a Broadcom v1.2 TPM. Fidelius outper-
forms Bumpy’s reported performance by 13×, running
with a latency of 10.59ms compared to Bumpy’s 141ms.
We believe this more than compensates for differences in
the computing power used to evaluate the two systems.
Although SGX-USB [29], whose source code is also un-
available, was developed on more recent hardware, we
cannot compare directly to their reported performance re-
sults because they report generic USB data transfer rates
into an enclave whereas we care about the latency of read-
ing and processing key presses.
Page Load Overhead. Figure 9 shows the page load
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Field size(s) W H W×H px Time (ms) Incr. (ms)
1 Small 171 50 8,550 195.83 -
1 Medium 342 50 17,100 199.20 3.38
1 Large 683 50 34,150 209.65 10.45
1 Extra large 911 50 45,550 214.74 -
2 Extra large 911 100 91,100 227.02 12.28
Figure 11: Key press to display latency when rendering forms.
Widths are fractions of the most popular screen width (w =
1366px): S= 1
8
w, M= 1
4
w, L= 1
2
w, XL= 2
3
w. Increments calcu-
lated from the previous row.
overhead incurred by Fidelius, not including remote at-
testation. Fidelius’s overhead includes the time for the
browser to inform the enclave of secure components and
for the enclave to verify signatures on them, totaling
35.3ms. We do not report time for remote attestation,
which depends on the latency to the attestation service.
Fortunately, waiting for the attestation server to respond
can occur in parallel with other page load operations be-
cause notifying the enclave of the existence of trusted
components and verifying signatures do not involve sen-
sitive user data. Moreover, attestation time is indepen-
dent of page content, so our measurements fully capture
Fidelius’s page load time increase as trusted components
are added. As seen in Figure 9, adding components does
not significantly increase page load time.
Performance Factors. Figure 10 shows the cost of vari-
ous components of our trusted display pipeline, described
in Section 9.1, which makes up almost all of Fidelius’s
performance overhead. The two most expensive oper-
ations that take place on the display are rendering the
overlay using the Picamera module and the refresh de-
lay we introduce in order to allow the Picamera module to
process frames without forming a queue of undisplayed
frames. The Picamera module and associated hardware on
the Raspberry Pi 3 is not optimized to add a dynamic over-
lay to the camera feed. A better approach would involve
directly manipulating the data from the Nuc computer’s
HDMI output instead of using it to simulate a camera and
placing overlays on top of the camera feed. This could
easily be achieved in a production deployment of Fidelius
and would dramatically reduce display latency.
We also considered how performance varies as the size
of the trusted components on a page increase. Figure 11
shows that latency increases linearly with the size of the
trusted component. This happens because as the size of
the overlay increases, it takes longer to decrypt, decode
and transfer the overlays. Taking steps to optimize the
display pipeline would further mitigate latency increase.
However, even under our current implementation, for two
full-page width input fields (See the two extra large input
field experiments in Figure 11), Fidelius has a display la-
tency of only 227ms. Also, a tenfold increase in pixels
(from one small field to two extra large fields) results in
only a 31ms latency increase.
11 Discussion and Extensions
Fidelius opens the door to a new class of secure web appli-
cations supported by the widespread availability of hard-
ware enclaves in modern computers. The fundamental
problems solved by Fidelius – reliably establishing a path
from I/O devices to an enclave residing in an otherwise
untrusted system and of protecting web applications with-
out moving large portions of a browser into an enclave –
have applications well beyond the login and payment ex-
amples described thus far.
Fidelius’s techniques and architecture can also support
more complex applications such as online tax filing or
even web-based instant messaging. The trusted I/O path
has applications beyond the web as well and could be
adapted to secure logins or desktop applications that use
enclaves for their core functionality but require interac-
tion with a local user on the machine. We anticipate that
Fidelius’s I/O approach will be very useful, as hardware
enclaves are most widely available on consumer desktop
and laptop computers.
We close with a discussion of possible extensions that
could broaden the applicability of our architecture or
would be important considerations in a widespread de-
ployment.
Usability of Trusted Devices. We have implemented Fi-
delius with a user and developer interface that provides
users with the necessary tools to interpret their interac-
tion with Fidelius properly and avoid UI-based attacks.
However, our interface represents only one possible de-
sign for interaction between users and the core Fidelius
functionality. A great deal of work has studied the ef-
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fectiveness of security indicators such as our indicator
lights [24, 25]. Other possible designs may, for example,
use secure attention sequences or separate trusted buttons
to initiate communication with trusted components. Fu-
ture work could explore this space to determine what ap-
proach works best for this application in practice.
Event Loop. Fidelius leaves the JavaScript event loop
outside the enclave to optimize the tradeoff between TCB
size and functionality. A number of additional applica-
tions could be enabled by moving the event loop into an
enclave, especially if there is a way to accomplish this
more efficiently than with a direct port that executes the
loop as-is in trusted hardware.
HTML Rendering. In order to render HTML forms, we
implemented a custom library that, given a description of
a form and its inputs, produces a bitmap that represents
the form. In order to extend support to other HTML tags,
we need to integrate a more versatile rendering engine
into our web enclaves. Existing libraries such as Nuk-
lear [34] provide a solid first step in this direction.
Root Certificate Store. Our current implementation of
the web enclave uses a limited number of public keys. To
scale to supporting any web site, the web enclave needs to
have a root certificate store inside the enclave.
Mobile Devices. We have described Fidelius in the set-
ting of a desktop device, but much of users’ interaction
with the web today takes place on mobile devices. While
much of the Fidelius architecture could apply equally well
in an enclave-enabled mobile setting, a trusted path sys-
tem for phones and tablets will necessarily look very dif-
ferent from the keyboard and display dongles used by
Fidelius. Android’s recent protected confirmation sys-
tem [35] represents a promising first step in this direction.
12 Related Work
NGSCB. In 2003 Microsoft announces the Palladium ef-
fort, later renamed NGSCB [36]. In that design, attes-
tation is provided by a TPM chip and enclave isolation
is provided by hardware memory curtaining. The project
was scaled back in 2005 presumably due to the difficulty
of adapting applications to the architecture. In contrast, as
we explained, web sites can take advantage of Fidelius by
simply adding an HTML attribute to web fields and forms
that it wants to protect.
SGX and the Web. TrustJS [17] explores the potential for
running JavaScript inside an enclave, demonstrating that
running trusted JavaScript on the client-side can expedite
form input validation. SecureWorker [18] provides the de-
veloper abstraction of a web worker while executing the
worker’s JavaScript inside an enclave. Our work uses the
ability to run JavaScript in an enclave as a building block
to enable privacy for user inputs in web applications. JIT-
Guard [37] uses SGX to protect against vulnerabilities in
Firefox’s JIT compiler.
Unmodified Applications on SGX. A handful of works
aim to allow execution of unmodified applications inside
an SGX enclave. Haven runs whole applications inside
an enclave [1], while SGXKernel [3], Graphene [5], and
Panoply [2] provide lower level primitives on which appli-
cations can be built. Scone [4] secures linux containers by
running them inside an enclave. Flicker [38] and TrustVi-
sor [39] use older hardware to provide features similar to
SGX on which general applications can be built, albeit
with weaker performance due to the older and more lim-
ited hardware features on which they build. We focus on
directly solving the problem of hiding user inputs in an
untrusted browser without using generic solutions in or-
der to minimize TCB and avoid the potential pitfalls of
porting a monolithic browser into a trusted environment.
SGX Attacks and Defenses. A number of side chan-
nel attacks on SGX have been shown to take advantage
of, among other things, memory access patterns [40–
42], asynchronous execution [43], branch prediction [44],
speculative execution [21, 22], and even SGX’s own se-
curity guarantees [45] to compromise data privacy. There
do, however, exist many defenses that have been shown
to evade these side channels, often generically, without a
great deal of overhead [30, 46–50]. Even more promis-
ing, researchers have proposed a series of other archi-
tectures [23, 51, 52] which defend against weaknesses in
SGX by design and are therefore invulnerable to broad
classes of attacks. As our work is compatible with generic
defenses and concerns itself primarily with higher level
functionalities built over enclaves, we do not consider side
channels in the presentation of Fidelius.
Protection Against Compromised Browsers. A num-
ber of software-based solutions for protection against
compromised browsers offer tradeoffs between security,
performance, and TCB size. Shadowcrypt [53] uses a
Shadow DOM to allow encrypted input/output for web
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applications, but is vulnerable to some attacks [54].
Terra [55] uses VMs to allow applications with differing
security requirements to run together on the same hard-
ware. Tahoma [56], IBOS [57], and Proxos [58] inte-
grate support for browsers as OS-level features, allowing
smaller TCBs and stronger isolation/security guarantees
than in a general-purpose OS. Cloud terminal [59] evades
the problem of local malware and protects against attack-
ers by only running a lightweight secure thin terminal lo-
cally and outsourcing the majority of computation to a
remote server.
Trusted I/O Path. While many works study how to use a
hypervisor to build a trusted path to users (e.g. [60–64]),
little work has been done in the trusted hardware setting.
SGXIO [16] provides a hybrid solution that combines
SGX with hypervisor techniques to allow a trusted I/O
path with unmodified devices. In contrast, our work re-
lies only on hardware assumptions with no need for a hy-
pervisor, but does require modified keyboard and display
devices. Intel has alluded to an internal tool used to pro-
vide a trusted display from SGX [65, 66], but no details,
source code, or applications are available for public use.
SGX-USB [29] allows for generic I/O but does not solve
the problem of mixing trusted and untrusted content in a
user interface as we do in both our keyboard and display.
ProximiTEE [67] bootstraps a similar generic trusted I/O
path off of a modified attestation procedure with new safe-
guards over standard SGX attestation.
Bumpy [28] (and its predecessor BitE [68]) use the
trusted execution environment provided by Flicker [38]
to provide a secure input functionality similar to ours.
Aside from the larger web architecture which we build
over our trusted I/O features, we go beyond these works
by 1) enabling interactivity with the trusted input via the
trusted display (Bumpy does not display characters the
user types) and 2) closing timing side channels on user
input (an improvement we also offer over SGX-USB).
13 Conclusion
We have presented Fidelius, a new architecture for pro-
tecting user secrets from malicious operating systems
while interacting with web applications. Fidelius protects
form inputs, JavaScript execution, network connections,
and local storage from malware in a fully compromised
browser. It also features the first publicly available system
for a trusted I/O path between a user and a hardware en-
clave without assumptions about hypervisor security. Our
open source implementation of Fidelius, accompanying
sample code, and a video demo are available at https:
//github.com/SabaEskandarian/Fidelius.
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